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1 Introduction
This paper documents a pattern of history dependence in house prices and transactions
by studying the universe of housing sales in England and Wales over a twenty-year pe-
riod. Specifically, house prices in the year a house was previously bought influence the
individual price at which the house sells next, as well as the owner’s propensity to sell.
The results are based on twenty million housing sales and are not driven by changes
in the composition of the houses transacted. We complement our analysis with matched
administrative data on mortgages and on-line house listings. The effects of history depen-
dence on house prices and the probability of sale can be material. Consider two identical
houses in the same location in 2014, one previously acquired in 2007, when aggregate
prices peaked and the other in 2001.1 Our results show that, all else equal, the house
bought in 2007 will carry a price premium of 5 percent over the one bought in 2001.
Moreover, the house bought in 2007 will have, on average, 50 percent less chance of sell-
ing. (We control for tenure duration so the results are not driven by shorter durations in
the more recent period.)
In aggregate, history dependence has the potential to contribute to the persistence in
prices and the pronounced volatility in sales volumes that we observe in housing markets.
History dependence is clearly at odds with a frictionless model in which the value of a
house and its liquidity depend exclusively on the future stream of dividends (rental value)
the property delivers. Two types of frictions can help us explain the presence of history
dependence.
The first is credit frictions, among which a leading explanation is the so-called down-
payment effect, a mechanism proposed by Stein (1995). For repeat buyers, a large percent-
age of their down payment comes from the sale of their previous homes, and, importantly,
a majority of home sales are to repeat buyers. Hence, owners who bought at high prices
will have, all else equal, limited home equity; they will then have higher reservation prices
1On average, the owner of the first house will expect a 2% loss in nominal terms, whereas the owner
of the second property will be facing a potential capital gain of 89%.
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and be less likely to sell than owners of comparable houses bought at lower prices, as they
have less money left after their property sale.
The second type is cognitive frictions and include mechanisms such as anchoring and
learning. The notion of anchoring or reference dependence goes back to Tversky and
Kahneman (1982) and builds on a well-established result from laboratory experiments:
in estimating the value of an asset agents tend to show a bias that overweighs possibly
irrelevant initial cues. In the context of the housing market, sellers may give excessive
weight to the price they paid (vis-a`-vis the market evolution of prices) when posting new
prices; if they bought at high prices, this will lead to higher advertised prices and more
time in the market. A particular kind of reference dependence is loss aversion, whereby
losses have greater impact on preferences than gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).
With learning, reservation prices are updated slowly following specific rules as in Davis
and Quintin (2016). In this framework history dependence arises because the previous
purchase price of a property is an important prior in evaluating its current value.
To disentangle the two groups of mechanisms, we study a sample of properties previ-
ously bought exclusively with cash, for which the down-payment effect should be muted.
We find evidence of history dependence on prices in this cash-only sample. However, for
these properties we find limited evidence of history dependence on selling propensities;
our results seem to be mostly driven by properties bought with leverage. We measure
leverage both along the extensive margin (whether the property was bought with a mort-
gage) and the intensive margin (the loan-to-value ratio at purchase). This evidence is
consistent with a role for a down-payment effect.
Understanding history dependence is a first step to inform the design of policies aimed
at preventing or reacting to future crises. In the context of the UK economy, the post-
crisis period led to a collapse in the volume of transactions, illustrated in Figure 1.
Transactions reached their peak in 2007 and then declined sharply. Prices reached their
peak slightly afterwards, subsequently fell, and only after 2009 experienced a recovery.
We investigate the quantitative implications of history dependence for the post-crisis
3
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Figure 1: Monthly house prices and sales, England and Wales
Notes: The figure shows the monthly quality-adjusted average price and the monthly total
number of transactions in England and Wales over 1995-2014. Data are taken from the England
and Wales Land Registry and quality-adjusted through an hedonic regression as described in
Section 3.
recovery of the housing market for different regions in England and Wales and measure
the relative strengths of the mechanisms at play.
Related literature On conceptual grounds, our paper builds closely on the seminal
contributions of Stein (1995) and Tversky and Kahneman (1982), both providing the
foundations for the underlying mechanisms behind history dependence that we analyze,2
and more recently on the literature exploring learning in a housing context (Anenberg,
2015; Davis and Quintin, 2016). On empirical grounds, our paper relates to the seminal
work of Genesove and Mayer (2001), who find strong evidence of loss aversion in the
context of the Boston condominium market between 1990 and 1997. The authors report
significant effects of loss aversion on list prices and time on the market and slightly less
2Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) also explore the consequences of down-payment constraints in a
theoretical model. Head et al. (2018) propose a dynamic model with housing search and defaultable
mortgages that produces a positive relation between outstanding debt, asking prices and time-to-sell.
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sharp effects on transacted prices. They also find a small role for down-payment effects.
Relatedly, Anenberg (2011) analyzes the San Francisco Bay Area housing market and
reports significant effects of loss aversion and leverage on transacted prices. We add to
the evidence provided by these two studies in a number of important ways. First, we
uncover the presence of history dependence for the universe of housing transactions in an
important market outside the US. Second, we investigate the quantitative implications of
history dependence and its underlying channels on the aggregate volume of transactions,
through our estimation of selling propensities. Third, we analyse history dependence
on the whole range of gains and losses (rather than focusing on loss aversion only) and
show significant and concave effects for expected gains, consistent with prospect theory.
Fourth, our novel focus on properties bought with cash allows us to convincingly argue
that not all history dependence is due to credit frictions.
In a recent contribution, Guren (2017) examines the relation between local house price
appreciation and list price, and use it as an instrument to study the relation between list
price and time on the market. In another recent paper, Hong et al. (2016) find some
suggestive evidence in the Singaporean condominium market of a kink in the selling
propensities at zero gains consistent with realization utility (Barberis and Xiong, 2012).
Despite the differences in scope and markets studied, our paper finds strong evidence of
cognitive frictions in line with Beggs and Graddy (2009), who study price anchoring in
art auctions of Modern, Impressionist, and Contemporary paintings in London and New
York (the authors do not study selling propensities). In focusing on the role played by
leverage in explaining economic activity, we join a vast literature that has documented
the adverse effects of financial frictions during the crisis and post crisis recovery. (See,
for example, Mian and Sufi, 2009, and the references therein.)
The gyrations in the housing market of the recent years have stimulated a number
of studies on the relation between house prices and mobility, in which the role of fi-
nancing and cognitive frictions is often critical. Two examples in that line of research are
Engelhardt (2003) and Ferreira et al. (2012) for the US economy. Their focus is on house-
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hold mobility with an eye on its labour market consequences. In this paper, we focus
specifically on housing sales, but clearly they would have repercussion for the mobility of
households.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology. Section
3 presents the data and documents the patterns of history dependence. It next studies
the potential channels underlying history dependence and their quantitative relevance.
Section 4 contains a similar analysis on house listings from a major UK online property
portal matched to the database on actual property sales, where we can examine history
dependence in list prices and time on market. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.
The Appendix contains additional material to complement the information in the text,
as well as a disaggregated analysis of the England and Wales’ regional housing markets.
2 Identifying history dependence
The (log) house price is usually modeled as:
pit = vi +Xiβ + δjt + wit, (1)
where pit is the transaction price of house i sold at time t in local area j, vi is a property-
specific fixed effect capturing time-invariant features, Xi is a vector of (time-varying)
housing characteristics, δjt is the aggregate house price level at time t in local area j
where i sits, and wit is an idiosyncratic error component which contains both unobserved
(time-varying) property characteristics and idiosyncratic price effects due to the features
of specific transactions.
To study history dependence we augment the standard hedonic regression above with
a function of the difference between today’s expected sale price, pˆit, and the house’s
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previous transaction price pis:
pit = vi +Xiβ + δjt + f(pˆit − pis) + wit, (2)
where s denotes the period when the house was previously purchased. The practical
implementation of (2) hinges on the definition of pˆit; in other words, on how owners
assess the expected value of their property. A simple approach is to assume that owners
apply to the purchase price they paid at time t the appreciation of the local price index
between s and t: pˆit = pis + (δˆjt − δˆjs). Equation (2) becomes:
pt = vi +Xiβ + δjt + f(ĜAIN jst) + wit, (3)
where ĜAIN jst = δˆjt − δˆjs is the (log) difference in aggregate house prices between time
t and when the property was bought (s).3 Notice that these are expected, rather than
realized, gains. To estimate the effect of gains and losses in a non-linear, non-parametric
way, we split ĜAIN jst into equally-sized bins for the different magnitudes of expected
gains/losses (ie losses between -0.25 and -0.15 per cent, between -0.15 and -0.05 per cent,
and so on).
To measure the effect of history dependence on selling propensities, we start from an
equation similar to (3) but with a 0/1 indicator as dependent variable. This indicator
takes the value one when the property was sold in a given year, and zero otherwise. Using
this approach, a property appears in the dataset each year after its first registered sale
(we cannot compute the ongoing ĜAIN jst before this first sale).
Figure 1 reveals that, for most of the sample period, England and Wales house prices
have been trending upwards. Keeping current sale year constant, such a trend leads to
a correlation between property tenure and ĜAIN jst. To control for this effect, we could
3In Genesove and Mayer (2001) ĜAIN jst = δˆjt − δˆjs − wis, where wis is the error coming from
estimating (1) on the previous purchase of the property. Because their specification does not use repeat
sales, this term includes time-invariant property characteristics not captured by their hedonic model. In
our methodology, wis only includes time-varying characteristics of the property or noise specific to its
previous transaction; the two measures of ĜAIN jst have a correlation of 92%.
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insert in the regression the duration of the tenure, measured as the number of years
between two sales. Such a variable would capture the time-invariant effect of tenure, but
would not address the potential change in tenure effects over the twenty years covered
by our sample. This is more easily seen in terms of selling propensities: any change in
the mobility rate of households over time would have an impact on the tenure effect.
We therefore control for all possible combinations of current year (denoted with dummy
variables λt) and year of purchase (denoted with λs):
yit = vi +Xiβ + δjt + f(ĜAIN jst) + λt ⊗ λs + wit, (4)
where y denotes either p, the log price, or q, the sale indicator. Our measure of gains and
losses, estimated at the local level j, is still identified. The term λt ⊗ λs has the added
advantage of controlling for time-varying unobserved property characteristics that are
homogeneous across England and Wales between a given pair of years. This additional
control could end up absorbing a substantial amount of variation in ĜAIN jst but, in
practice, we show that results are similar whether we include it in the regression or not.
Our coefficient of interests on ĜAIN jst could still be biased by other time-varying
property characteristics not captured by λt ⊗ λs. For instance, a possible correlation
between home improvements and house prices (as in Choi et al., 2014) would affect the
analysis, to the extent that the rate at which properties are renovated or extended differs
across postcode districts. To address this remaining threat, we run a robustness check
on the subsample of properties that have never been extended.4
Mechanisms History dependence could be driven by credit or cognitive frictions. To
disentangle the two mechanisms, we look for sellers in the data that are likely to be credit
constrained in their next house purchase. (The next section explains how we implement
this in practice.) We denote this group of borrowers with an indicator variable, constr,
4England and Wales Energy Perfiormance Certificate data for residential properties record whether
an extension has been carried out on a house or apartment.
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and run the following regression:
yit = vi+Xitβ+δjt+f
(
ĜAIN jst
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cognitive frictions
+ f
(
ĜAIN jst
)
× constr︸ ︷︷ ︸
credit frictions
+constr+λt⊗λs+wit. (5)
The non-interacted term, f
(
ĜAIN jst
)
, captures the effect of history dependence that
are common to all properties, independently of whether the owner is credit constrained.
We therefore take it as a measure of the part of history dependence that depends on
cognitive frictions. The part that depends on credit frictions is captured by the interaction
f
(
ĜAIN jst
)
× constr.
3 History dependence in transaction prices and sell-
ing propensities
The first part of this section describes our main data source, the England and Wales Land
Registry (LR), which contains twenty years of residential transactions from January 1995
to December 2014. We explain how we compute our measure of local aggregate house
prices and how we construct our two estimation datasets—one to analyze transaction
prices and one to analyze selling propensities. We then show the results for history
dependence and explore its quantitative relevance.
3.1 Data and summary statistics
The LR records all residential property transactions, with few exceptions:5 The dataset
contains close to twenty million sales for twenty years of data, that is, approximately
one million sales per year. For each sale, the LR contains the precise postcode, the
street name, the street number, and the apartment number if the property belongs to
5The exceptions are listed at http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/market-trend-data/
public-data/price-paid-data, where a public version of the dataset is available. Most of the
excluded transactions refer to sales that were not for full market value, for examples a transfer between
parties on divorce.
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a multi-unit building. The LR records three attributes of the property: its type (flat,
terraced, semi-detached, detached); whether the property is new; and the tenure type of
the property (freehold or leasehold).6 Date of Transfer in LR is the day written on the
transfer deed, that is, the date of completion, when keys and funds change hands.
Before analyzing history dependence, we use the LR to compute the aggregate level
of house prices needed to create the ĜAIN jst variable. We do so at the postcode dis-
trict level, by running regression (1) at an annual frequency for each postcode district
in England and Wales. Our procedure has therefore two steps: we first estimate equa-
tion (1) to compute expected gains and losses and then estimating (4) to compute the
effect of interest.7 Our dataset includes 2,345 postcode districts; the average postcode
districts contains around 10,000 individual addresses. We keep our analysis at the annual
frequency because this allows a more straightforward analysis of selling propensities, for
which we need to expand our dataset in a property-by-year format. Because the literature
has highlighted the seasonality of the housing market (Ngai and Tenreyro, 2014), we add
quarterly dummies to our main specification.8
Analysis of transaction prices Our empirical analysis relies on the identification of
repeat sales. We consider two sales as happening on the same property when they share
the same postcode, street name, street number, apartment number (if any), and property
type (flat, terraced, semi, detached). Transaction prices from repeat sales allow us to
create both a measure of realized gains (GAINt) and a measure of expected gains for
6A leasehold is a tenancy arrangement by which someone buys a property for a limited number of
years, usually 99, 125 or 999. It is usually associated with flats and is a time-varying characteristic of the
property, because leaseholds can be converted to freeholds (see Giglio et al., 2015; Bracke et al., 2018).
As such we use a dummy indicator for leasehold tenancy as part of our control variables.
7In our baseline estimates, the first step does not include any measure of gains and losses, as these
are not taken into account by market participants when estimating house price indices at the local level.
In the Appendix, we show results from an alternative setup which incorporates history dependence in
the first step—we run an iterating procedure to make δˆ’s and ĜAIN ’s consistent across the two steps.
This alternative setup yields similar results to our baseline methodology. In the Appendix we also show
that results maintain their statistical significance when standard errors are bootstrapped to take into
account that ĜAIN jst is a generated regressor.
8We include both quarter of purchase and quarter of sale, and interact them, resulting in 16 (4 by 4)
combinations of dummies.
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Table 1: Summary statistics, analysis of transaction prices
Notes: The analysis of transaction prices is based on microdata from the England and Wales
Land Registry (LR) for the years 1995-2014. The first column contains information on all the
sales included in the LR. The second column describes the sample used in the analysis: it is made
of all properties which have at least two sales in the dataset, and excludes for each property the
first of such sales. (The first sale provides us with the previous price or the previous aggregate
price index to include in the regression that checks for history dependence.) The third column
is similar to the second but only refers to properties whose first sale took place after 2001. For
this sample we can tell whether the property was purchased with a mortgage and investigate
the mechanisms behind history dependence. Finally, the fourth column describes properties
whose first sale took place after March 2005 and can potentially be matched to the Product
Sales Data (PSD), a dataset of residential mortgages where we can identify the initial LTV with
which a house was bought.
Sales with Sales with
Land Registry Sales with previous purchase previous purchase
All sales previous purchase in 2002-2014 in 2005-2014
1995-2014 in 1995-2014 (funding data) (mortgage data)
Sales (N) 19,628,516 7,527,731 3,199,389 1,385,653
Properties 12,089,086 5,038,658 2,570,092 1,234,381
Current sale price (pt)
Mean 161,266 184,100 211,919 231,694
p1 18,500 25,250 40,000 50,000
p25 70,500 93,000 119,000 125,000
p50 124,500 145,000 165,000 176,500
p75 195,000 220,000 243,000 250,000
p99 755,000 825,000 925,000 1,095,000
Property type (proportion)
Flat 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.24
Terraced 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.32
Semi 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25
Detached 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19
Lease 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.28
New 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Expected log capital gains (ĜAIN jst)
Mean 0.41 0.18 0.04
p1 -0.13 -0.16 -0.19
p25 0.11 0.02 -0.03
p50 0.33 0.13 0.03
p75 0.67 0.29 0.10
p99 1.24 0.75 0.43
Years btw previous purchase and current sale (DURt)
Mean 4.42 3.57 3.21
p1 0 0 0
p25 2 1 1
p50 4 3 3
p75 6 5 5
p99 16 11 8
Matched-in variables (mean)
Bought with mortgage 0.72 0.71
Bought with LTV>80% 0.25
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Table 2: Summary statistics, analysis of selling propensities
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the dataset used to analyze the selling propensity
of properties in any given year. The dataset is created by taking the LR samples (whose
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1) and expanding them so that each house has an
observation in each year since its first appearance in the LR. (For the empirical analysis we
create a variable which equals one if property i sells in year t, and zero otherwise.) To keep
the computational burden manageable, for the analysis of selling propensities we extract a ten
percent random sample of the data.
Properties bought in Properties bought in Properties bought in
1995-2014 2002-2014 2005-2014
Property × year obs (N) 13,788,911 6,766,378 3,629,414
Sales 721,385 300,962 128,121
Properties 1,167,571 860,635 634,300
Sell prob (Sales/N) 0.05 0.04 0.04
Purchase price (ps)
Mean 122,400 172,495 204,461
p1 16,000 23,500 45,000
p25 55,000 96,000 123,239
p50 90,000 144,000 168,500
p75 154,000 207,000 237,000
p99 535,000 675,000 785,000
Expected log capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.43 0.15 0.02
p1 -0.17 -0.20 -0.23
p25 0.08 0.01 -0.05
p50 0.30 0.10 0.02
p75 0.76 0.26 0.08
p99 1.33 0.78 0.41
Years since purchase (DURt)
Mean 5.82 4.48 3.67
p1 1 1 1
p25 2 2 2
p50 5 4 3
p75 8 6 5
p99 17 12 9
Property type (proportion)
Flat 0.15 0.19 0.20
Terraced 0.30 0.31 0.31
Semi 0.29 0.28 0.28
Detached 0.25 0.23 0.21
Lease 0.21 0.24 0.25
New 0.10 0.10 0.10
Matched-in variables (averages)
Bought with mortgage 0.73 0.74
Bought with LTV>80% 0.48
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the regression analysis (ĜAIN jst). Figure A1 in the Appendix, shows the two similar
distributions of realized and expected gains.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the analysis of transaction prices and distin-
guishes between ‘sales’ and ‘properties’ to highlight the presence of repeat sales. The
first column displays statistics for the entire LR while the other columns only include
properties that appear at least twice in the LR. Since 2002, the LR dataset can be aug-
mented with an additional variable (‘charge’) that indicates the use of a mortgage to
purchase the property.9 Since 2005, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has
been recording information on all owner-occupier mortgages into the Product Sales Data
(PSD).10 These more restricted samples contain more flats and more leasehold properties.
There are no new properties in these samples, since transactions are part of repeat-sale
pairs and the first purchase (which could potentially refer to a new build) is not part of
the analyzed data (it is used to construct the ĜAIN jst variable). The sales descibed in
the third and fourth column of Table 1 allow us to investigate the mechanisms behind
history dependence thanks to the additional information on how housing purchases were
financed.
Given the aggregate movement in house prices shown in Figure 1, for most households
in England and Wales homeownership has produced gains rather than losses—as shown
by the descriptive statistics on ĜAIN jst in Table 1. Additional calculations, not reported
in the table, reveal that the second column of the table contains half a million sales with
an expected loss (a negative ĜAIN jst) out of 7.5 million transactions.
Analysis of selling propensities To estimate the impact of history dependence on
a property’s selling propensity (and, in aggregate, on the number of transactions) we
reshape and expand the dataset so that each house has an observation in each year since
9This variable is not available in the public dataset but can be purchased from the Land Registry.
10The PSD have been provided to the Bank of England under a data-sharing agreement. The PSD
include regulated mortgage contracts only, and therefore exclude other regulated home finance products
such as home purchase plans and home reversions, and unregulated products such as second charge
lending and buy-to-let mortgages.
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its first appearance in the LR (its first sale after 1995). With 12 million properties and
20 years, the final extended datasets has over 120 million rows (the average property
appears for the first time in the middle of the sample and we can follow it for ten years).
To keep the empirical analysis computationally manageable, we extract a ten percent
random sample of the properties. We create a variable, qit, which equals one if property
i sells in year t, and zero otherwise. We treat the first sale as missing because we do not
observe ĜAIN jst before that observation.
3.2 History dependence
The left hand side part of Figure 2 shows the effect of gains and losses on transaction
prices. The analysis is based on regression (4).11 All regressions control for individual-
property fixed effects, time-varying characteristics (whether the property was purchased
new or second-hand; property it was sold as leasehold or freehold) as well as all combina-
tions of purchase and sale year. The regressions include year-by-postcode district fixed
effects to control for average local prices.
In the charts, negative bin values indicate losses. A loss between 25 and 15 percent
is associated to a three percent increase in the transaction price; a loss between 15 and
5 percent is associated to a one and a half percent increase. By contrast, gains are
associated to lower transaction prices (as compared to the baseline category of properties
that expect to break even). The most populated bin (gains between 35 and 45 percent)
is associated with a 4 percent decrease in the transaction price.
Standard errors get bigger for larger gains because there are fewer properties with long
holding periods. Moreover, for long tenures the collinearity between year of purchase-
sale and ĜAIN jst increases substantially (only properties with a long holding period
experience capital gains of more than 100 percent).
The right hand side part of the Figure shows the effect of expected gains and losses
on selling propensities. We aim at investigating whether the purchase price of a property
11Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix show the regression coefficients.
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Figure 2: Effects of gains and losses
Notes: The charts show the coefficients and corresponding 95-percent confidence bands for the
k dummy variables associated with different expected gains/losses (ĜAINkt’s) in the regression
yt = vi + Xβ + δjt +
∑
k γkĜAIN jkst + λt ⊗ λs + wt, where yt is the transaction price (pt) in
the upper chart and an binary indicator of sale (qt) in the bottom chart (we omit the individual
subscript i for simplicity). The precise values of the coefficients are reported in Table A1 and
A2 in the Appendix. All regressions control for individual-property fixed effects, time-varying
characteristics (whether the property was purchased new or second-hand; property it was sold
as leasehold or freehold) as well as all combinations of purchase and sale year. Regressions have
year-by-postcode district fixed effects (δjt in the regression formula) and standard errors are
double-clustered by year and postcode district.
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affects the likelihood that a house is traded in any subsequent period. As explained in
the methodology section, we use a linear model—equation (4)—with a binary dependent
variable indicating whether the property was sold in any given year. We get a similar
picture to the one for transaction prices, albeit with the reversed sign. Losses induce
lower selling propensities and gains higher selling propensities. While the unconditional
annual transaction probability of a house in the sample is 5 percent as indicated by Table
2, properties with repeat sales are traded more often by construction. For those proper-
ties, the unconditional transaction probability is 10 percent, and we should compare the
magnitude of the effects against this number. Properties expecting a capital loss between
25 and 15 percent have a selling propensity which is two percentage points lower in any
given year. From there, the effect on selling propensities is gradually increasing with
expected gains, reaching a positve four percentage points for gains between 35 and 45
percent. Once again the effect flattens out slightly for large—above 35 percent—expected
gains.
Figure A2 and A3 in the Appendix replicate Figure 2 for each region in England and
Wales. The pattern of transaction prices and selling propensities appears to be similar
across different parts of England and Wales.
Alternative specifications Regression (4) on which we base our main analysis is
designed to control for as many confounding factors as possible. It is instructive to check
whether the patterns identified here are also found with less stringent specifications. The
results of this analysis are presented in Appendix Figures A4-A6.
In our first alternative specification we do not include purchase- and sale-year com-
binations (λs ⊗ λt). This is equivalent to not controlling for holding period and other
time-varying factors that are homogeneous across England and Wales. The results on
transaction prices are similar to before, although with larger standard errors, indicating
that including tenure increases the precision of estimates. The results on selling propen-
sities display the same increasing pattern but magnitudes and standard errors are much
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larger, implying—as expected—that it is necessary to control for holding period when
analysing house selling propensities.
In another specification we do not include individual-property fixed effects. The over-
all pattern of history dependence appears to be the same, but effects tend to revert back
to zero for larger gains. One possible explanation for this result is that neglecting gran-
ular fixed effects makes estimates less precise especially when focusing on large expected
gains. A related, alternative regression uses full-postcode rather than individual-property
fixed effects. Since in the UK a full postcode corresponds to 15 properties on average,
this specification allows us to still control for granular effects (albeit not property-specific)
while avoiding the reduction in sample that comes with the use of repeat sales. Results
are similar to the baseline case but a little smaller quantitatively.
Finally, we run a separate regression for properties which have been flagged as ex-
tended, to check that our results are not driven by time-varying property improvements.
The England and Wales Energy Performance of Buildings Data12 lists for each individual
property whether an extension was added. The data is drawn from Energy Performance
Certificates issued for domestic and non-domestic buildings constructed, sold or let since
2008. Figure A7 in the Appendix shows that there is no significant difference in the
history dependence displayed by these two groups of properties.
Linearity and prospect theory Prospect theory predicts a value function which is
steeper for losses than for gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Genesove and Mayer,
2001). At first sight Figure 2 suggests that the effect on transaction prices and selling
propensities over the range of gains and losses could be approximated by a linear function.
At the same time, a slight change in slope is apparent in the chart, especially for gains
above 30-40%. To study this more formally, we run a restricted version of our baseline
regression (4):
yit = vi +Xiβ + δjt + γ0 ĜAIN jst + γ1 ĜAIN jst I{ĜAIN jst < x}+ λt ⊗ λs + wit. (6)
12Available at https://epc.opendatacommunities.org.
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Table 3: Linearity and loss aversion
Notes: The table shows selected coefficients from regressions of the form yit = vi +Xiβ + δjt +
γ0 ĜAIN jst + γ1 ĜAIN jst I{ĜAIN jst < x} + λt ⊗ λs + wit, where ĜAIN jst enters linearly
and interacted with a dummy variable indicating that ĜAIN jst is below a threshold x. This
specification is used to test whether the reaction of prices and selling propensities is steeper for
negative gains, indicating loss aversion. The other variables and the sample are as in Figure 2.
Dependent variable: Transaction price (pt)
No break x = 0 x = 0.2 x = 0.4 x = 0.6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ĜAINjst -0.073 -0.068 -0.073 -0.074 -0.075
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ĜAINjst × I(ĜAINjst < x) -0.144 -0.014 -0.007 -0.009
(0.031) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002)
N 4,285,851 4,285,851 4,285,851 4,285,851 4,285,851
Dependent variable: Selling propensity (qt)
No break x = 0 x = 0.2 x = 0.4 x = 0.6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ĜAINjst 0.081 0.074 0.081 0.083 0.084
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ĜAINjst × I(ĜAINjst < x) 0.094 0.004 0.022 0.021
(0.027) (0.012) (0.005) (0.003)
N 13,745,918 13,745,918 13,745,918 13,745,918 13,745,918
In this specification capital gains enter in a linear fashion, augmented by an additional
effect for gains lower than x, which is meant to capture loss aversion. The regression
coefficients for different levels of x are reported in Table 3; the first column contains the
estimated γ0 coefficient when no loss aversion term is added to the regression. Compared
to this benchmark, the specification that yields that most notable change in γ0 while at
the same time producing the most statistically significant γ1 has x = 0, consistent with
loss aversion. Moreover, the additional contribution to the slope of the ĜAIN jst effect
becomes smaller, but mostly still significant, for expected gains above 0.2, 0.4 or 0.6,
revealing a declining marginal utility of price consistent with prospect theory.
The role of credit and cognitive frictions Mortgage debt increased in the UK up
to the financial crisis in parallel with house prices (Bunn and Rostom, 2015). Is there a
relation between history dependence and household leverage? To answer this question,
we have to focus our attention on post-2001 transactions—where we can distinguish
between properties purchased with cash and properties purchased with a mortgage—and
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Figure 3: Credit vs cognitive frictions (2002–2014)
Notes: The charts replicate the analysis of Figure 2 but focuses on the results for prop-
erties purchased after 2001, for which information is available on whether the transac-
tion was financed with cash or with a mortgage. The regression is yt = Xβ + δjt +∑
k γ1k
(
ĜAIN jkst × post2001
)
+
∑
k γ2k
(
ĜAIN jkst ×mortgage
)
+ λt ⊗ λs + wt. The in-
dicator variable post2001 singles out properties for which a purchase is available after 2001; the
indicator variable mortgage tags properties bought with a mortgage. The regression coefficients
are reported in Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix.
19
post-2005q1 transactions—where we can distinguish, among the mortgaged properties,
properties purchased with a LTV greater than 80 (the median LTV in the Product Sales
Data) from other properties. Because our attention is on history dependence, in both
cases this funding information refers to the previous purchase of the property (at time
s), not to the current period being analyzed (t).13
We show results graphically in Figure 3 and 4 and in tabular form in Table A1 and A2
in the Appendix. The regressions are run on the same sample as before, to preserve the
property fixed effects. However, ĜAIN jst is interacted with the relevant subsample (post-
2001 or post-2005q1 transactions) so that we can focus on the additional information
available.
The analysis brings forward potentially different mechanisms for history dependence in
transaction prices and selling propensities. In Figure 3, the baseline effect on transaction
prices (top-left chart) is reminiscent of the result on the entire sample (Figure 2) whereby
transaction prices decline with higher gains. The results are however noisier, with larger
standard errors. The top-right chart shows that the additional effect of ĜAIN jst for
properties bought with a mortgage are limited, except for large gains.
In the regression on selling propensities, both the baseline category and properties
bought with a mortgage display a pattern similar to the main result, with selling propen-
sity increasing with expected gains. However, effects are sharper for properties bought
with a mortgage. Given that the coefficients on properties bought with a mortgage repre-
sent the additional effect of leverage on top of the baseline effect showed in the bottom-left
chart, results suggest that credit friction play an important role in this type of history
dependence.
We run the same analysis focusing on post-2015q1 transactions, where we can distin-
guish the effect of properties bought with a high leverage (i.e. with an LTV higher than 80
percent) from the effect on other mortgage-funded properties. Similar to the analysis of
post-2001 transactions, the top row of the figure shows that most of the effect of expected
13Hence we do not attempt to estimate the current LTV for the properties in our sample, but focus
exclusively on the LTV at the time of purchase.
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Figure 4: Nonlinear effects of expected gains and losses after 2005q1
Notes: The charts replicate the analysis of Figure 2 but focuses on the results
for properties purchased after March 2005, for which information is available on the
characteristics of the mortgage used to finance the transaction. The regression is
yt = Xβ + δjt +
∑
k γ1k
(
ĜAIN jkst × post2005q1
)
+
∑
k γ2k
(
ĜAIN jkst ×mortgage
)
+∑
k γ3k
(
ĜAIN jkst × ltv80
)
+ λt ⊗ λs + wt. The indicator variable post2005q1 singles out
properties for which a purchase is available after March 2005; the indicator variable mortgage
tags properties bought with a mortgage; ltv80 indicates properties that were bought with a
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio greater than 80. Information on the characteristics of mortgages
is available from the Product Sales Data (PSD) since March 2005. The match between Land
Registry (LR) and PSD, described in Appendix B.2, generates four subsets of post2015q1 trans-
actions: matched properties bought with a high LTV, matched properties bought with a low
LTV, properties that were bought with cash according to the LR, and properties that were
bought with a mortgage according to the LR but do not match with the PSD. All these groups
are included in the regression; the latter group is controlled for through a group-specific dummy.
The precise values of the coefficients are reported in Table A1 and A2 in the Appendix.
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gains on prices is present for properties bought with cash, but standard errors are large.
The bottow row of the figure shows that all the effect of history dependence on selling
propensities comes from properties bought with a mortgage. Within this group, there is
both an effect on properties bought with a low leverage and an additional effect on prop-
erties bought with an LTV greater than 80 percent. This is slightly different from Figure
3, where an effect on properties bought with cash was apparent. However, both figures
confirms the importance of down-payment effects in explaining selling propensities.
The post-2007 fall in transactions As shown in Figure 1, after 2007 the aggregate
number of housing transactions in England and Wales did not return to its pre-crisis level
even after seven years, in 2014. Can the results on history dependence be related to this
fall in housing market activity? To answer this question, we first compare the distribution
of ongoing expected capital gains in the two periods, 2001-2007 and 2008-2014. Figure 5
shows there were practically no losses in the 2001-2007 period, and the bulk of properties
was in the 0-100 percent capital gain interval. By contrast, in 2008-2014 a few properties
were experiencing potential losses and many other properties had expected gains close to
zero.
In 2001-2007 the average annual selling propensity for a property was 7.7 percent;
this propensity fell to 3.3 percent in the 2008-2014 period. To compute the contribution
of history dependence to this fall, we first calculate the change in each of the bins of
the expected gain distribution between the two periods, then multiply these differences
by the coefficients obtained from the regression on selling propensities and shown in the
lower half of Figure 2. By summing all these numbers we get the total contribution, in
percentage points, of history dependence to the fall in transactions: -1.4. Since the total
fall in transactions between the two periods was 4.4 percentage points, history dependence
explains around one third of the fall.
The fall in transactions in the post-crisis period happened in conjunction with house
price resilience: without history dependence house prices in England and Wales would
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Figure 5: Distribution of ongoing capital gains, pre and post crisis
Notes: The charts show the distribution of the ĜAIN jst variable in two subperiods: 2001-
2007 and 2008-2014. The bin width replicates the allocation of dummy variables used to split
ĜAIN jst and compute the coefficients shown in Figure 2, 3, and 4. For each property, ĜAIN jst
is computed as the difference between the current estimated log house price index and the log
index when the house was purchased. The indices are calculated at the local authority level.
The distributions are estimated for the analyisis of selling propensities and hence ĜAIN jst is
computed for each property in each year since it first appeared in the Land Registry—these are
current expected gains rather than realized gains.
have experienced a larger fall. To estimate the size of this counterfactual drop we em-
ploy the same method as above: we multiply the changes in the bins that make up the
distribution of expected gains by the coefficients shown in the upper half of Figure 2.
The overall effect on prices is more modest: we find that England and Wales house prices
would have been one percent lower in the absence of history dependence.
4 Extensions: list prices and time on the market
In this section we study history dependence in the selling decision. The analysis is based
on data from WhenFresh, a company that collects all daily listings from Zoopla, a major
UK property portal. Using this source allows us to study list prices and time on the
market for properties that were advertised for sale in England and Wales after 2008.
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Many of these properties can be matched back to a previous purchase on the LR. Some
of these properties were later sold and recorded again on the LR.
4.1 Data and summary statistics
Zoopla is the second UK property portal in terms of traffic. Its dataset starts in November
2008. In this paper we restrict our attention to sale listings where an address can be
precisely identified. The dataset contains information on the address of properties, list
prices, and property attributes (such as property type and number of bedrooms).
Zoopla collects data only from estate agents, not individual sellers. In the UK,
most transactions occur via estate agents (in 2010, only 11 percent of homes were sold
privately—see Office of Fair Trading, 2010).
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the WhenFresh/Zoopla dataset. The table
contains information on both the dataset used to analyze list prices (the first two columns)
and the dataset used to study the monthly probability of sale once advertised (the last
two columns). In both cases, the table shows separate statistics for the entire sample of
advertised properties and the sample of properties that were actually sold (as indicated
by a match between the listing data in WhenFresh/Zoopla and the transaction data in
the Land Registry). Because of the way history dependence is measured, all samples
are restricted to those properties for which a previous sale was identified in the Land
Registry.
Similar to the analysis of unconditional selling propensities in the previous section, the
analysis of conditional probabilities of sale is performed on an expanded dataset where
each row corresponds to a property-time observation. In this case, the time dimension is
monthly; we allow for properties to stay on the market for up to 12 months, as in Anenberg
(2015)—in this way we avoid cases in which property listings are simply ‘forgotten’ on
the website.
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Table 4: WhenFresh/Zoopla summary statistics
Notes: The table contains statistics for the subset of WhenFresh/Zoopla listings for which it was possible
to retrieve a previous purchase in the Land Registry (LR) (the matching procedure is described in
Appendix B.3). All refers to this entire sample whereas Sold contains listings that match a subsequent
sale in the LR. The first two columns report statistics for the analysis of list prices; the third and
the fourth column describe the dataset used to analyze the time on market of listed properties. The
latter dataset is created by expanding the original sample for list price analysis so that each advertised
property has an observation in each month since its appearance on Zoopla until its sale or withdrawal.
(We truncate the number of month at 12 when there is no sale.)
Prices Probabilities of sale
All Sold All Sold
(previous LR (matched with LR record (previous LR (matched with LR record
record) after listing) record) after listing)
Listings (N) 2,601,406 1,127,866 2,601,406 1,127,866
Properties 2,040,936 1,079,646 2,040,936 1,079,646
Monthly observations 13,800,249 5,261,150
List price (lt)
Mean 232,658 236,199 228,792 236,315
p1 59,950 64,950 60,000 64,950
p25 130,000 139,950 129,950 139,950
p50 185,000 189,995 180,000 189,995
p75 275,000 275,000 270,000 275,000
p99 925,000 900,000 899,950 899,950
Property type (proportion)
Flat 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15
Terraced 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.32
Semi 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.31
Detached 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.22
Bedrooms 2.84 2.81 2.85 2.82
Lease 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.20
New 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
Capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.30
p1 -0.19 -0.17 -0.20 -0.18
p25 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
p50 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.13
p75 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.59
p99 1.27 1.29 1.26 1.27
Years since last purchase (DURt)
Mean 6.68 6.97 6.73 6.94
p1 0 0 0 0
p25 3 4 4 4
p50 6 6 6 6
p75 9 10 9 10
p99 17 17 17 17
Months since listing (TOMt)
Mean 4.40 3.57
p1 1 1
p25 2 2
p50 4 3
p75 6 5
p99 12 10
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4.2 History dependence in list prices and time on the market
The nonparametric results on the effect of ĜAIN jst are displayed in Figure 6. Because
the WhenFresh/Zoopla data start in 2008, using individual-property fixed effects as in the
first part of this paper would restrict the sample to properties that transacted multiple
times in a time window of only a few years. For this analysis, we use full-postcode fixed
effects instead.
The top-left chart of Figure 6 is derived from the sample of all listings; the chart shows
that sellers who expect a loss tend to post higher list prices; whereas properties that are
experiencing a gain tend to post a lower price. This is consistent with the analysis on
actual prices in the previous section, although the effect appears smaller when compared
to Figure 2. The chart below, on the left-hand side of the medium row, shows the
results for the sample of properties that were eventually sold. The effects, especially the
discounts on properties that enjoy substantial expected gains, are larger and comparable
to Figure 2. This intriguing difference seems to suggest that discounts associated with
large expected gains help the selling process.
The results on the rate at which a house sells once it has been advertised on the prop-
erty portal (top- and medium-right charts) are consistent with this interpretation When
analysing the sample of all listings, for which price effects are muted, monthly proba-
bilities of sale vary significantly between properties with different expected gains. By
contrast, when analysing the sample of sold properties, probabilities of sale are relatively
homogeneous.
The bottom-left chart in Figure 6 reports the effect on transaction prices, for prop-
erties advertised on Zoopla that were actually sold. The effects of expected gains are
similar to the ones on list prices and reminiscent of the results for the entire LR sample
in Figure 2. The effects on implied discounts, defined as the difference between list and
transaction price, are relatively small, reaching around 1 percent for properties with large
expected gains, but consistent with the idea that sellers expecting large gains are more
willing to accept lower offers. The similarity between effects on listing and transaction
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Figure 6: Effects of gains and losses on list prices and time on the market
Notes: The charts report the coefficients and associated 95-percent confidence bands on the
ĜAINkt dummy variables in the regression yt = φh +Xβ + δt +
∑
k γkĜAINkt + λs ⊗ λt +wt,
where φh represents full-postcode fixed effects (in contrast to the individual-property fixed
effects in the first part of the paper). The confidence bands in the chart are computed through
standard errors double clustered by year and local authority. The two charts in the upper
row refer to the entire sample, made of all listings that have appeared on the Zoopla property
portal since 2009, provided that a previous sale of the same property can be retrieved from
the Land Registry (LR). The dependent variables are the property list price (lt) in the first
chart and a monthly selling indicator (ht) in the second chart. The middle row replicates the
analysis of the upper row on the Sold subsample, made of the subset of listings that can be
matched with a subsequent sale in the LR, provided that the sale occurs within 12 months of
the listing. Also the bottom row shows results estimated from the Sold subsample. The bottom
left chart is based on a regression where the dependent variable is the final transaction price
(p) of properties, whereas the bottom right chart reports results of a regression on the discount
between listing and transaction price (l − p).
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prices seems to indicate substantial seller bargaining power.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates history dependence in the housing market using the universe of
housing transactions in England and Wales in the last twenty years. We find that house
prices in the year a house was previously bought influence the price at which the house
sells next, as well as the likelihood that a transaction takes place. Our data allow us to
separate properties which were bought with a mortgage and properties which were bought
with cash. For a subsample of the data, we can also separate out properties which were
bought with a high-LTV mortgage.
While point estimates of the history dependence effects are larger for houses financed
through a mortgage and in particular high-LTV ones, consistent with downpayment ef-
fects as in Stein (1995), part of the effect on transaction prices (but not on selling propen-
sities) is independent of leverage and seems to be driven by cognitive frictions.
We find similar evidence of history dependence for advertised prices; sellers appear to
have enough bargaining power to pass through a significant part of their history premia
to transaction prices.
Our findings raise interesting trade-offs in an environment in which housing market
activity is history dependent. In particular, while higher house price growth could spur
more housing market activity today, it raises the need to sustain this growth in the future,
feeding in the unsettling need for potentially spiraling house prices.
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Figure A1: Distribution of gains, 1995-2014
Notes: The upper left chart shows the distribution of expected gains, ĜAIN jst in Sample 1.
Expected gains are computed as the change in the postcode-district house price index between
the year of the current sale (t) and the year in which the property was previously purchased
(s). The upper right chart shows the distribution of actual gains, GAINt, where actual gains
are computed as the log house price difference between two pairs of repeat sales. The relation
between expected and actual gains is plotted in the bottom chart, which reports results for 0.05
percent random sample of the data.
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Figure A2: Effects of expected gains and losses on transaction prices, by region
Notes: The charts replicate the analysis of the upper half of Figure 2 for each region in England
and Wales. The charts show the coefficients and associated confidence bands for the k dummy
variables associated with different expected gains/losses (ĜAINkt’s) in the regression pt =
vi +Xβ + δt +
∑
k γkĜAINkt + λs ⊗ λt + wt, run separately for each region. Regressions have
year-by-postcode district fixed effects and standard errors are double-clustered by year and
postcode district.
33
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
North East
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
North West
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
Yorkshire and The Humber
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
East Midlands
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
West Midlands
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
East of England
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
London
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
South West
-4
-2
0
+2
+4
+6
+8
 
[-.25,-.15] [.15,.25] [.55,.65] [.95,1.05]
Expected gain (%)
Wales
Figure A3: Effects of expected gains and losses on selling propensities, by region
Notes: The charts replicate the analysis of the bottom half of Figure 2 for each region in England
and Wales. The charts show the coefficients and associated confidence bands for the k dummy
variables associated with different expected gains/losses (widehatGAINkt’s) in the regression
qt = vi +Xβ + δt +
∑
k γkĜAINkt + λs ⊗ λt + wt, run separately for each region. Regressions
have year-by-postcode district fixed effects and standard errors are double-clustered by year
and postcode district.
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Figure A4: Robustness: No control for holding period
Notes: The two charts display the results of an alternative version of Figure 2, where the
regression specification excludes the control for holding period. In other words, we do not
include the purchase- and sale-year combinations λs ⊗ λt from equation (4).
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Figure A5: Robustness: No individual-property fixed effects
Notes: The two charts display the results of an alternative version of Figure 2, where the
regression in equation (4) excludes individual-property fixed effects (vi).
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Figure A6: Robustness: full-postcode fixed effects
Notes: The two charts display the results of an alternative version of Figure 2, where the
regression in equation (4) has full-postcode fixed effects instead of indivdual-property fixed
effects (vi).
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Figure A7: Robustness: No houses with extensions
Notes: The two charts display the results of an alternative version of Figure 2, where the
sample only contains properties that are not labelled as “with extension” in the UK Energy
Performance Certificate dataset.
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Figure A8: Robustness: Iterating the expected gain measure
Notes: The solid dots replicate the results of Figure 2 in the paper; they show the coefficients and
corresponding 95-percent confidence bands for the k dummy variables associated with different
expected gains/losses (ĜAINkt’s) in the regression yt = vi + Xβ + δjt +
∑
k γkĜAIN jkst +
λt ⊗ λs + wt. The crosses show the coefficients of a similar regression, yt = vi + Xβ + δjt +∑
k γkĜAIN
′
jkst+λt⊗λs+wt, where ĜAIN ′jkst is constructed from the local authority-by-year
effects δjt estimated in the previous iteration. The hollow dots show the results from a second
iteration of ĜAIN ′jkst.
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Table A1: Effects of expected gains and losses on transaction prices
Notes: The first column of the table contains the coefficients and standard errors for the k dummy
variables associated with different gains/losses (ĜAINkt’s) in the regression pt = vi + Xβ + δt +∑
k γkĜAINkt + λs ⊗ λt + wt, where pt is the (log) transaction price. The coefficients are displayed
graphically with their 95 percent confidence bands in the left hand side part of Figure 2 (column 1).
Column 2 shows the coefficient on the interaction ĜAIN t×post2001, where post2001 indicates sales whose
previous purchase took place after 2001, in the regression pt = vi+Xβ+δt+
∑
k γ1k(ĜAINkt×post2001)+∑
k γ2k(ĜAINkt ×Mortgage) + λs ⊗ λt + wt. Column 3 shows the coefficient on ĜAINkt ×Mortgage
on this same regression. Information on whether the buyer used a mortgage to finance the transaction
is available from the Land Registry since 2002.
Column 4 shows the coefficient on the interaction ĜAIN t × post2005q1, where post2005q1 indicates
sales whose previous purchase took place after March 2005, in the regression pt = vi + Xβ + δt +∑
k γ1k(ĜAINkt× post2005q1) +
∑
k γ2k(ĜAINkt×Mortgage) +
∑
k γ3k(ĜAINkt×HighLTV ) +λs⊗
λt + wt, where HighLTV denotes properties bought with a mortgage with a loan-to-value ratio (LTV)
greater than 80 percent. Both Mortgage and HighLTV are defined only within Sample3, which derives
from the match between LR and PSD which is described in Appendix B.2. Standard errors double-
clustered at the year and postcode district (PCD) level are in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Transaction price (pt)
(1995-2014) (2002-2014) (2005-2014)
All Cash Mortgage Cash Low-LTV High-LTV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gain [-.25,-.15] 0.032 0.026 0.009 0.024 -0.003 0.024
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Gain [-.15,-.05] 0.016 0.015 0.002 0.015 -0.004 0.009
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Gain [.05,.15] -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 0.000 -0.009 -0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Gain [.15,.25] -0.015 -0.010 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004)
Gain [.25,.35] -0.023 -0.019 -0.005 -0.014 0.003 -0.009
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004)
Gain [.35,.45] -0.031 -0.022 -0.009 -0.013 -0.007 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006)
Gain [.45,.55] -0.037 -0.031 -0.016 -0.025 -0.004 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.007)
Gain [.55,.65] -0.042 -0.034 -0.022 -0.017 -0.005 -0.028
(0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.021) (0.028) (0.008)
Gain [.65,.75] -0.047 -0.037 -0.033 -0.041 0.006 -0.039
(0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.020) (0.027) (0.017)
Gain [.75,.85] -0.053 -0.028 -0.048 -0.082 0.057 -0.036
(0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.037) (0.036) (0.022)
Gain [.85,.95] -0.056 -0.034 -0.067 -0.055 -0.170 0.168
(0.007) (0.024) (0.015) (0.052) (0.096) (0.082)
Gain [.95,1.05] -0.062 -0.028 -0.099 -0.105 0.240 -0.175
(0.007) (0.036) (0.024) (0.064) (0.081) (0.100)
Gain [1.05,1.15] -0.067 -0.035 -0.124 -0.295 0.091 -0.012
(0.007) (0.041) (0.031) (0.161) (0.190) (0.109)
Gain [1.15,1.25] -0.073 -0.056 -0.150 -0.276 0.000 0.259
(0.008) (0.080) (0.053) (0.132) (0.000) (0.008)
Gain [1.25,1.35] -0.083 -0.063 -0.212 -0.053 -0.379
(0.008) (0.086) (0.051) (0.057) (0.031)
Gain [1.35,1.45] -0.089 0.088 -0.027 0.741 0.000
(0.010) (0.149) (0.193) (0.060) (0.000)
N 4,280,790 4,280,790 4,280,790 4,280,790 4,280,790 4,280,790
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Table A2: Effects of expected gains and losses on selling propensities
Notes: The table is analogous to Table A1 but refers to the regressions of the type qt =
vi + Xβ + δt +
∑
k γkĜAINkt + λs × λt + wt, where qt is a binary indicator of sale. The
coefficients are displayed graphically with their 95 percent confidence bands in the lower half
of Figure 2 (column 1, 2, and 5) , 3 (column 3 and 4), and 3 (column 6 and 7). All regressions
control for property type as measured by the Land Registry (X: flat, terrached, semi-detached
or detached property; new or second-hand property; property sold as leasehold or freehold) and
for a nonparametric function (a third-degree polynomial) of the number ofyears between sales
(DURt). Regressions have year-by-postcode district (PCD) fixed effects (δt in the regression
formula) and standard errors are double-clustered by year and postcode district.
Dependent variable: Selling probability (qt)
(1995-2014) (2002-2014) (2005-2014)
All Cash Mortgage Cash Low-LTV High-LTV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gain [-.25,-.15] -0.023 -0.016 -0.009 0.015 -0.016 -0.007
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Gain [-.15,-.05] -0.010 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 -0.005 -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003)
Gain [.05,.15] 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.010
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Gain [.15,.25] 0.020 0.012 0.013 0.000 0.006 0.023
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004)
Gain [.25,.35] 0.032 0.022 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.026
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.003)
Gain [.35,.45] 0.040 0.027 0.022 0.016 0.000 0.037
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004)
Gain [.45,.55] 0.045 0.030 0.026 0.020 0.000 0.034
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004)
Gain [.55,.65] 0.048 0.033 0.029 0.027 0.000 0.012
(0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.007)
Gain [.65,.75] 0.050 0.034 0.032 0.016 0.000 0.028
(0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) (0.010)
Gain [.75,.85] 0.052 0.035 0.039 0.020 0.000 0.027
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008)
Gain [.85,.95] 0.054 0.038 0.040 0.016 0.000 0.094
(0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.000) (0.021)
Gain [.95,1.05] 0.056 0.040 0.043 0.043 0.000 -0.041
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.039) (0.000) (0.042)
Gain [1.05,1.15] 0.059 0.043 0.044 0.034 0.000 -0.029
(0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.000) (0.013)
Gain [1.15,1.25] 0.063 0.047 0.046 0.000 0.000 1.003
(0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024)
Gain [1.25,1.35] 0.067 0.051 0.054 0.003 0.000 0.017
(0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012) (0.000) (0.027)
Gain [1.35,1.45] 0.071 0.056 0.055 0.000 0.008 0.021
(0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.000) (0.009) (0.007)
N 13,704,178 13,704,178 13,704,178 13,749,301 13,749,301 13,749,301
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Table A3: Effects of expected gains and losses on list prices
Notes: The regressions are similar to those in Table A1 and A2 but with different dependent
variables, samples and controls for average local conditions.
In terms of dependent variables, columns 1 and 2 use WhenFresh/Zoopla list prices (lt); columns
3 and 4 use a 0/1 variable indicating whether the property was sold in each month after it was
advertised for sale on Zoopla; column 5 uses LR transaction prices and column 6 uses the log
difference between Zoopla list prices and their final transaction price (for those properties that
were sold).
Colums 1 and 3 are based on the sample of all Zoopla listings for which a previous purchase
can be found on the LR. The other colums restrict this sample to those listings for which a
subsequent sale can be found in the LR.
Because of the more limited size of the sample, we use price indices and fixed effects at the
local authority level (δjt in equation 4) and full-postcode fixed effects as the granular control
for time-invariant property characteristics (vi in regression 4).
Standard errors in parentheses are double-clustered at the year and local-authority level.
Dependent variable: Listing price (lt) Sell prob (ht) Price (pt) Discount (lt − pt)
All Sold All Sold Sold Sold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gain [-.25,-.15] 0.002 0.008 -0.008 0.001 0.010 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Gain [-.15,-.05] 0.003 0.005 -0.007 -0.000 0.007 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Gain [.05,.15] -0.005 -0.007 0.007 0.004 -0.008 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Gain [.15,.25] -0.006 -0.011 0.012 0.009 -0.012 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000)
Gain [.25,.35] -0.006 -0.012 0.015 0.011 -0.015 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain [.35,.45] -0.006 -0.013 0.015 0.008 -0.016 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain [.45,.55] -0.008 -0.016 0.015 0.010 -0.020 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Gain [.55,.65] -0.009 -0.016 0.014 0.008 -0.021 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Gain [.65,.75] -0.011 -0.018 0.012 0.011 -0.023 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Gain [.75,.85] -0.012 -0.020 0.011 0.011 -0.026 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Gain [.85,.95] -0.012 -0.021 0.009 0.008 -0.026 0.005
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Gain [.95,1.05] -0.012 -0.024 0.009 0.009 -0.029 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Gain [1.05,1.15] -0.014 -0.022 0.011 0.013 -0.028 0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Gain [1.15,1.25] -0.015 -0.023 0.013 0.011 -0.029 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
Gain [1.25,1.35] -0.014 -0.024 0.012 0.011 -0.029 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
Gain [1.35,1.45] -0.013 -0.019 0.009 0.009 -0.026 0.008
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
Gain [1.45,1.55] -0.014 -0.027 0.007 0.015 -0.029 0.002
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004)
Gain [1.55,1.65] -0.008 -0.022 0.001 0.009 -0.021 -0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.010) (0.005)
Gain [1.65,1.75] -0.002 -0.014 0.001 -0.009 -0.015 0.001
(0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idiosyncratic factor (pˆ0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 2,597,866 1,126,859 13,778,554 5,256,126 1,126,859 1,126,859
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B Matched-in data sources
B.1 Mortgage v cash additional LR variable
Information on funding of housing transactions can be purchased from the LR. The LR
provides a file with complete address, price paid and Deed date, (but no transaction ID)
which we watch to the publicly available LR dataset.
Figure A9 shows that the total number of cash purchases in England and Wales is
less cyclical than the number of mortgages.
Table A4 shows some descriptive statistics for Sample 2 grouping properties by fund-
ing source (mortgage or cash). Properties bought with cash are usually less expensive,
except at the top of the price distribution (above the 99th percentile).
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Figure A9: Mortgage vs non-mortgage purchases, 2002-2014
Notes: The bars represent the number of sales in the England and Wales Land Registry (LR)
since information on the funding of housing transaction has ben available (2002). This informa-
tion is collected in a variable denoted ‘charge’, which indicates whether an additional ownership
claim (on top of the owner’s) is present on the property in question.
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Table A4: Summary statistics: bought with a mortgage vs bought with cash
Notes: This table repeats the analysis of the upper half of Table 1, focusing on Sample 2 and
contrasting properties that were bought with a mortgage with properties that were bought with
cash.
Previous purchase in 2002-2014
Bought with a mortgage Bought with cash
Sales 2,299,688 899,701
Properties 1,941,359 811,728
Current sale price (pt)
Mean 214,981 204,092
p1 49,500 27,000
p25 121,000 110,000
p50 168,950 159,950
p75 245,000 235,000
p99 925,000 940,000
Property type (proportion)
Flat 0.22 0.25
Terraced 0.34 0.31
Semi 0.26 0.23
Detached 0.19 0.22
Lease 0.27 0.30
New 0.00 0.00
Expected Log log capital gains (ĜAIN jst)
Mean 0.18 0.16
Median 0.14 0.10
p01 -0.16 -0.16
p10 -0.04 -0.03
p90 0.47 0.46
p99 0.75 0.75
Years btw previous purchase and current sale (DURt)
Mean 3.74 3.13
p01 0 0
p10 1 0
p50 3 2
p90 8 8
p99 11 11
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B.2 Mortgage information from the Product Sale Data
To match in information on mortgages from the PSD to the LR we perform a record
linkage exercise between the two datasets.
Data preparation As a preliminary step, we restrict the PSD to initial mortgages and
exclude remortgages; we limit the sample to England and Wales and exclude Scotland
and Northern Ireland. These exclusions leave us with a dataset of 6.2m observations
between 31 March 2005 (the start day of the PSD data collection) and 31 December 2014
(the end of the sample analysed in this paper). We call this dataset Relevant PSD. In the
same period, the LR contains 8.3m observations. Since we can identify which LR sales
were funded with a mortgage, we restrict our attention to those, leading to a reduction of
the relevant LR observations to 6.3m, a number similar to the size of the Relevant PSD.
The LR contains information on:
• sale price
• address
• sale date (completion)
• type of property
The PSD variables that could be related to LR information are:
• sale price or property value
• postcode
• date of mortgage account opening
• type of property.
In the Relevant PSD The sale price variable is missing for 2.3m sales, but the property
value variable is missing for only 554 observations. Comparing sale price with property
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value for records were both of these are non-missing reveals that the two numbers coincide
most of the times; hence we create a new price variable which equates the purchase price
when it is available, and the property value otherwise. In theory, the price variable should
match with the corresponding sale price in the LR. In practice, in a preliminary analysis
we tabulated all the specific values of price found in the PSD, compared them with all
the individual sale prices found in the LR, and found that around 30% of price values
found in the PSD are not found in the LR.14
The postcode variable is never missing in the PSD. As a preliminary step in the
analysis, we found that around 90% of postcodes found in the PSD are found in the
LR—a better result than the one on prices.15
The date in which a bank transfer the mortgage amount to the buyer is the completion
date or a few days before. Figure A10 shows that, on a monthly scale, there is a 1:1
relation between observations in the LR and the PSD.
Finally, data on property type are missing for 40 percent of the observations in the
PSD, hence we do not use them for the matching.
Data matching We assign an ID to every combination of postcode, date, and price in
the LR and the PSD.16 We proceed in steps, from the best matches to less precise ones:
1. We first select observations that match on all three variables (postcode, date, and
price)—there are 1.5m of them. We create a variable indicating matching quality
and assign these observations the maximum value (4). We then remove their IDs
from the list of LR and PSD observations to be matched.
2. We select observations that match on postcode and price, which sometimes results
in multiple matches (the same combination of postcode and price can be associated
with different dates). For each LR ID, we select the observation where the distance
14Manual inspection of those prices revealed no noteworthy pattern. Their distribution was similar to
the price distribution in the LR.
15Again, manual inspection of non-matching postcodes revealed no noteworthy pattern.
16There are around 60,000 duplicates in postcode, date, and price in both the LR and the PSD,
corresponding to 1 percent of observations. We eliminate duplicates before proceeding.
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Figure A10: Number of observations by month in the Land Registry and Product Sale
Data before matching
Notes: The Land Registry (LR) sample is made of all England and Wales registered sales
between March 2005 and the end of 2014. The PSD sample is made of all mortgages for house
purchase (excluding remortgages) in England and Wales for the same period. (The PSD started
to collect data on mortgages on April 1st, 2005. We keep March 2005 sales in the LR because
we allow for a maximum difference of 30 days, in both directions, between the sale date in the
LR and the mortgage starting date in the PSD.)
between the LR and PSD date is the lowest, limiting the selection to instances
where this distance does not exceed 30 days. We do the same for each PSD ID.
Once we have a group of uniquely matched IDs (in this case, 2.5m sales), we assign
them match quality 3 and remove them from the list of IDs that still need to be
matched.
3. We select observations that match on postcode and date. We eliminate duplicate
IDs similarly to the previous step, by selecting for each ID the observation where
the percentage difference between the LR and PSD price is the lowest, limiting
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the selection to differences of plus or minus 10 percent. This step of the process
produces 150,000 additional matches with match quality 2.
4. Finally, we create all the combinations of the remaining observations that match
on postcode only. Within duplicates observations of the same ID, we select the
observation with the lowest date difference. If there are ties, we select the obser-
vation with the lowest price difference. All the observations where the differences
between variables exceed the thresholds (30 days for dates, 10 percent for prices)
are eliminated. This step produces 270,000 additional matches with quality 1.17
There are in total 4,540,412 matched sales, which correspond to 73 percent of all PSD
mortgages. In the paper, we show results based on matches with qualities from 4 to 1.
Running the analysis only on matches with quality 4 to 3 yields almost identical results
(this group corresponds to 90 percent of matched properties).
Descriptive statistics of matching results Table A5 shows the characteristics of
properties in Sample 3 (transaction price analysis). The aggregate statistics for this
sample are showed in the third column of the upper half of Table 1; this table splits
the sample into four groups: properties that match with the PSD and were purchased
with an initial LTV greater than 80 percent, properties that match with the PSD and
were purchased with an initial LTV lower or equal to 80 percent, properties that the LR
indicates as having been purchased with a mortgage but that do not match with the PSD,
and properties that according to the LR were bought with cash. In general, properties
purchased with a higher LTV are cheaper and have longer holding periods.
Figure A11 shows the distribution of mortgage LTVs in the relevant PSD dataset, the
subset of observations that match with the Land Registry, and the observations belonging
17This matching algorithm is implicitly assuming that postcodes exactly match. In other words, we
have not made any attempt to allow for errors in postcodes. To check whether these errors are likely to
be relevant, we joined the two datasets on price and date and then compared the postcodes in the LR
and PSD. If errors in postcodes were a relevant issue, we would expect to see several instances among
the combined observations where postcodes in the two datasets were similar but not identical. A visual
inspection of these observations revealed no such instances in the first 100 rows of the dataset.
46
to Sample 3 used in the transaction price analysis. Spikes are apparent next to important
LTV values such as 75, 80, 85, 90 and 95 percent. This bunching is due to the way in
which UK mortgages are priced (see Best et al., 2015).
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Table A5: Summary statistics: Sample 3 subgroups generated by Land Registry-Product
Sales Data match
Notes: This table repeats the analysis of the upper half of Table 1, focusing on Sample 3 and
distinguishing between the four subgroups of sales which derived from the Land Registry (LR)-
Product Sales Data (PSD) match. The first two groups refer to repeat sales where the previous
purchase matches with a PSD mortgage: properties that were bought with a high LTV (>80%)
and properties that were bought with a low LTV. The third and the fourth group refer to repeat
sales where the previous purchase does not match with a PSD mortgage: either properties that
according to the LR were purchased with a mortgage (third column) or properties that according
to the LR were bought with cash (fourth column).
Sample 3
(previously purchased in 2005-2014)
Matched Not matched
Bought with Bought with Bought with Bought with
LTV>80% LTV≤80% Mortgage Cash
Sales 377,241 366,426 237,134 404,852
Properties 362,682 354,297 230,259 381,419
Current sale price (pt)
Mean 204,169 269,705 232,902 222,231
p1 60,000 68,000 43,000 41,000
p25 123,500 150,000 117,000 120,000
p50 166,000 208,000 167,500 168,950
p75 239,960 300,000 250,000 248,000
p99 765,000 1,250,000 1,300,000 1,100,000
Property type (proportion)
Flat 0.24 0.17 0.30 0.26
Terraced 0.39 0.29 0.34 0.28
Semi 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.24
Detached 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.22
Lease 0.28 0.20 0.35 0.31
New 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Expected Llog capital gains (ĜAIN jst)
Mean 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
p1 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18
p25 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
p50 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01
p75 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.07
p99 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.38
Years btw previous purchase and current sale (DURt)
Mean 3.82 3.60 2.81 2.51
p1 0 0 0 0
p25 2 2 1 0
p50 4 3 2 2
p75 6 5 5 4
p99 8 8 8 8
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Figure A11: LTV distributions in the Product Sales Data and the matched observations
Notes: The top chart reports the distribution of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of mortgages for
house purchases in the Product Sales Data (PSD), which covers the universe of homeowner
mortgages since April 2005. The middle chart refers to the mortgages that match a sale in
the Land Registry (LR) according to the matching algorithm described in Appendix B.2. The
bottom chart reports the distribution of LTVs for purchases of properties that belong to Sample
3 in the analysis of LR transaction prices in this paper.
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B.3 Whenfresh/Zoopla data
The raw data is provided by data company WhenFresh and corresponds to all listings
appeared on property portal Zoopla. For each listing we would like to know:
1. whether the previous purchase of the property is on the LR, and
2. whether the listing attempt successfully resulted in a subsequent sale recorded in
the LR.
We perform two matches, which we call match 1 and match 2, corresponding to the two
objectives above. (An alternative and equivalent approach would be to perform just one
of the Zoopla-LR matches and then retrieve the other matches by exploiting repeat sales
in the LR).
Data cleaning We initially restrict the dataset to sale listings in England and Wales
with a complete address which appeared on the website in 2009-201418—this corresponds
to 6,861,663 observations. Excluding listings where the creation date is after the deletion
date or where the initial price or the number of bedrooms are missing brings the number
of observations to 6,770,311. In order to avoid duplicates, we eliminate listings on the
same address happening before 180 days of the first one—ending with 4,405,445 listings.
Furthermore, to avoid outliers we eliminate listings corresponding to the first and 99th
percentile of the list price distribution. We have now 4,317,919 listings to be matched
with the LR.
Data matching Property addresses in the WhenFresh/Zoopla do not have the same
format as addresses in the LR. Moreover addresses are provided to Zoopla by estate
agents and may occasionally contain errors.
After trying different matching approaches, we obtained the best performance by
requiring an exact match on (1) the two postcodes (the one in the LR and the one in the
18Zoopla was launched in November 2008 but given that most of our specifications are based on local
authority × year fixed effects, 2008 observations are too sparse to be used.
50
WhenFresh/Zoopla dataset) and (2) the first part of the address, which corresponds to
the street number for a house and the appartment number for a flat. The combination
of these two variables is likely to identify a unique property,19 allowing us to sidestep the
problem of complete addresses being written in different formats.
The combination of property address and listing date identifies a listing in the When-
Fresh/Zoopla dataset. After having joined the two dataset through postcode and the first
part of the address, duplicates in listings and LR sales still exist. In the context of match
1, we eliminate all combinations where the listing date occurs before the LR date, and
then we choose the match where the two dates are closest—we end up with 2,610,073.
For match 2, we only keep combinations where the listing date occurs before the LR
sale date and keep the observations where the distance in days between the two days is
shortest. Furthermore, we eliminate all instances where the sale occurred more than one
year after the first listing, because it becomes less clear whether these two events should
be grouped together as the same sale attempt.
19A complete UK postcode identifies around 10-15 units. In theory, for postcodes encompassing more
than one street, the combination postcode-street number would not be sufficient to identify a unit; a
similar issue would occur for two apartment small buildings being located in the same postcode and
using the same apartment numbering convention. In practice, visual inspection of the matching results
demonstrated that these instances are extremely rare, at least within the group of observations and the
time frame which are relevant for us.
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